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Abstract
This paper analyzes the determinants of government debt and social security for
the old in a closed-economy, overlapping-generation model. Under the probabilistic
voting, the model presents (i) an intergenerational link of resource allocation via
debt and social security; (ii) multiple political equilibria; and (iii) a negative cor-
relation between tax and debt. These three results are robust to the introduction
of public goods as an alternative government expenditure or to the introduction of
income heterogeneity within a generation.
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1 Introduction
Many OECD countries have experienced the aging of their population over the past two
decades (OECD, 2010). Aging increases the share of old voters in population, providing
an incentive for politicians to expand expenditure on the old (Galasso, 2006). Given
the budgetary constraint, politicians might choose to nance increased expenditure by
issuing more government debt. This choice shifts the scal burden from current to future
generations, resulting in an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio (Roseveare et al., 1996;
Yashiro, 1997).
Evidence seems to suggest that this scenario is playing out in Japan. Over the past
two decades, the share of the old over 65 years old has increased by 50%, the ratio of social
security expenditure to GDP has increased by 63%, and the debt-to-GDP ratio has almost
doubled, from 86% in 1995 to 172% in 2008 (OECD, 2010). However, the scenario does
not necessarily hold for other OECD countries. For the last two decades, the debt-to-GDP
ratio has always been over 100% in Greece and Italy. In contrast, the ratio decreased by
half in Australia, Denmark, Sweden, and New Zealand. In addition, the ratio has been
low and stable at approximately 50% in Norway (OECD, 2010). The evidence suggests
the need to consider another factor that explains the di¤erences in debt-to-GDP ratio
between countries.
Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) provided a new insight, that is, the di¤erences
between countries public goods preferences, into the problem of the debt-to-GDP ra-
tio. They developed a small, open, overlapping-generation model with many countries in
which countries di¤er in their public goods preferences. In this framework, they employed
probabilistic voting on public goods provision for which, in each period, the amount of
public goods is determined to maximize the weighted sum of the utilities of young and old
generations (see, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1998), Hassler et al. (2005) and
Song (2011), which adopt the probabilistic voting in an overlapping-generation model).
Under the aforementioned voting mechanism, Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011)
characterized a Markovian political equilibrium in which policy in each period is condi-
tioned on a payo¤-relevant state variable (i.e., government debt). In this equilibrium, a
country with a strong preference for public goods attains a tight scal policy with low
tax and low debt accumulation, whereas the other countries experience loose scal policy
with high tax and high debt accumulation. Specically, debt is accumulated up to the
natural debt limit in the latter group of countries when the labor supply is inelastic.
Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) considered Scandinavian countries in the former
category and Greece and Italy in the latter. However, this interpretation does not t
the empirical evidence in terms of taxes. The data suggest that Scandinavian countries
implement higher tax rates than do Greece and Italy (OECD, 2010). In other words,
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the positive correlation between tax and the debt-to-GDP ratio, which was shown in
Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011), does not well explain the empirical tax and debt
evidence from OECD countries.
Röhrs (2010) extended the model of Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) by as-
suming a closed economy in which government debt is owned only by residents. In her
framework, debt level is below the debt limit regardless of the public goods preference.
Therefore, a closed-economy assumption resolves the accumulation of debt to the upper
bound level observed in the model of Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011). However,
her closed-economy model breaks an intertemporal link via debt: there is no e¤ect of
government debt on intertemporal resource allocation. In addition, her model still shows
a positive correlation between tax and debt.
The aim of this paper is to reconsider the models of Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2011) and Röhrs (2010). Specically, our analysis is based on the model by Röhrs (2010)
but di¤ers from hers in that we introduce a social security payment to the old as a
government expenditure (see, for example, Grossman and Helpman, 1998; Azariadis and
Galasso, 2002; Conde-Ruiz, Galasso and Profeta, 2011). Our assumption is motivated
by the rapid increase of social securitys contribution to government expenditure due
to population aging (OECD, 2011). Under this alternative framework, we demonstrate
the following three results, which were not shown in Röhrs (2010): (i) an intertemporal
link of resource allocation via debt; (ii) multiple political equilibria; and (iii) a negative
correlation between tax and debt.
The mechanism behind the rst result is as follows. In the framework of Röhrs (2010),
the government expenditure is limited to a public goods provision that is enjoyed by both
the young and the old: there is no intergenerational resource reallocation via debt politics.
In contrast, in the current framework with social security, a higher level of social security
payment to the initial old is nanced at the expense of successive generations loss of
consumption: there is an intergenerational transfer of private goods from the young to
the old. The introduction of social security into the framework of Röhrs (2010) restores
an intertemporal link of resource allocation via government debt.
The second and the third results are obtained in the following way. In our closed-
economy framework, one unit of government bond is equivalent to one unit of saving.
Because old-age consumption is the sum of saving and social security, government bond
repayment and social security payment are perfect substitutes for households. Given this
feature, probabilistic voting on scal policy results in a Markovian social security policy
function that produces a one-to-one trade-o¤between government debt and social security.
With this policy function, the government expenditure, comprising debt repayment and
social security payment, becomes constant over time; that is, for nancing expenditure,
an elected government sees no di¤erence between tax and government debt issue. This
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property produces the second result, the multiplicity of equilibria, and the third result, a
negative correlation between tax and debt.
We introduce two extensions to the basic model to determine the robustness of our
result. The rst extension is to introduce a public goods provision as an alternative means
of government spending; the second extension is to allow income heterogeneity including
two types of agents, the rich and the poor. We show that the three results in the basic
model still hold under these extended frameworks. Our analysis and results therefore sug-
gest that old-age social security is a crucial and strong factor in characterizing Markovian
political equilibrium in an overlapping-generation model with government debt.
In addition to Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) and Röhrs (2010), our work is
related to several others in the literature including Grossman and Helpman (1998), Azari-
adis and Galasso (2002), Hassler et al. (2003), Hassler et al. (2005), Hassler, Storesletten
and Zilibotti (2007), Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008, 2011), Arawatari and Ono (2009),
DAmato and Galasso (2010) and Conde-Ruiz, Profeta and Galasso (2011). The current
work is similar to these studies in that we focus on Markovian social security policy in
voting but di¤ers from them in that we consider the case of an unbalanced budget, as
commonly observed in OECD countries.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model: the
preferences of agents are specied by the utility function with a constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Section 3 characterizes political equilibria in the basic model
and provides the main result of this paper. Section 4 considers two extended models
and shows that the main result in the basic model still holds under these two extensions.
Section 5 returns to the basic model but assumes a generalized utility function and shows
that the main result in Section 2 is not a¤ected by this generalization. Section 6 provides
concluding remarks. All the proofs are given in Appendix.
2 The Model and Economic Equilibrium
Consider a discrete-time closed economy that starts at t = 0. The economy is populated
by overlapping generations of two-period-lived homogeneous agents who work in youth
(the rst period of life) and retire in old age (the second period of life). Each agent has
one child, implying a constant population.
Agents consume private goods in both periods of life. The lifetime utility of a young
agent born in period t is specied by
max
(cyt )
1    1
1   +  
(cot+1)
1    1
1   ;
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where cyt is consumption in youth, c
o
t+1 is consumption in old age,  2 (0; 1) is a discount
factor, and  > 0 is the inverse of the interest-rate elasticity of consumption. A lower 1=
implies a lower interest-rate elasticity of consumption.
Agents work in youth and obtain a constant wage, y(> 0). They consume a part of
their after-tax income in youth and save the rest for their old-age consumption. They
store income from youth to old age by buying one-period government bonds. In old age,
agents obtain the return from government bonds as well as old-age social security provided
by the government and consume them.
Individual budget constraints in youth and old age are given by, respectively,
cyt + ptb
d
t  (1  t)  y;
cot+1  bdt + zt+1;
where bdt is the demand for one-period government bonds, pt is the price of a government
bond sold at time t, t 2 [0; 1] is a period-t labor income tax rate, and zt+1 is old-age
social security benet.
Each agent maximizes his/her utility subject to the budget constraints. Solving the
utility maximization problem yields the consumption Euler equation that determines the
trade-o¤ between consumption in youth and old age:
cyt =

pt

 1

 cot+1:
With the budget constraints and the Euler equation, we obtain the demand function
for government bond,
bdt =
1
pt + (pt=)
1


(
(1  t)  y  

pt

 1

 zt+1
)
; (1)
and consumption functions in youth and old age, respectively,
cyt =
(pt=)
1

pt + (pt=)
1

 f(1  t)  y + ptzt+1g ; (2)
cot+1 =
1
pt + (pt=)
1

 f(1  t)  y + ptzt+1g : (3)
The revenue of the government in period t consists of newly issued one-period bonds
and a labor income tax, ptbst + ty, where b
s
t is the supply of bonds that pay one unit of
goods in period t + 1 and ty is the tax revenue from the young born in period t. The
expenditure of the government in period t consists of social security payments, zt, and the
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repayment of government bonds issued in period t   1, bst 1. Therefore, the government
budget constraint is given by
ptb
s
t + ty = zt + b
s
t 1 8t  0: (4)
Economic Equilibrium
An economic equilibrium is dened as follows.
Denition 1. For a given sequence of policies, ft; zt; bstg1t=0 with an initial condition
b 1, an economic equilibrium is a sequence of allocations fcyt ; cot ; btg1t=0 and prices
fptg1t=0 such that
(i) the utility maximization problem is solved for each generation t; that is, agents
maximize utility with respect to their demand for government bond, bdt , subject to
the budget constraints;
(ii) the sequence of policies satises the government budget constraint (4) in every period;
(iii) asset market clears at all dates: bst = b
d
t = bt 8t  0, where bt denotes the equilibrium
level of government bond.
The asset-market-clearing condition becomes
bt =
1
pt + (pt=)
1


"
(1  t)  y  

pt

 1

 zt+1
#
;
where the left-hand and right-hand sides correspond to the supply and the demand of
government bond, respectively. The price that clears the market is implicitly given by
pt = P (bt; (1  t)  y; zt+1):
With this equilibrium price, the clearing condition is rewritten as

pt

 1

=
(1  t)  y   P (bt; (1  t)  y; zt+1)  bt
bt + zt+1
: (5)
With (2), (3), and (5), we can write the consumption functions as
cyt = (1  t)  y   P (bt; (1  t)  y; zt+1)  bt; (6)
cot+1 = bt + zt+1: (7)
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The indirect utility functions of the young and the old in period t, denoted by V yt and
V ot , are given by, respectively,
V yt =
[(1  t)  y   P (bt; (1  t)  y; zt+1)  bt]1    1
1   +  
(bt + zt+1)
1    1
1   ; (8)
V ot =
(bt 1 + zt)1    1
1   : (9)
3 Political Equilibrium
The current paper assumes probabilistic voting in the demonstration of the political mech-
anism. In each period, the government in power maximizes a political objective function.
Formally, the political objective function in period t is given by 
t = !V ot + (1   !)V yt ,
where ! 2 [0; 1] is the relative weight of old agents. An explicit microfoundation for
this modeling is explained in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 3) and Acemoglu and
Robinson (2005, Appendix).
The present paper restricts its attention to Markov-perfect equilibria, as described
by Krusell et al. (1997). Voters condition their strategies only on payo¤-relevant state
variables. In the current framework, the government bond, denoted by b, is the only
payo¤-relevant state variable. We specically restrict our methods to stationary Markov
perfect equilibria of the voting game so that the policy function is time invariant.
Hereafter, we omit time indexes and use recursive notation. Let b0 denote the govern-
ment bond issued in the current period and redeemed in the next period; let z0 denote
the social security payment in the next period. We denote bDL as the debt limit, which
is formally dened below, and focus on the case of b  0 throughout the paper.
Denition 2. A stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium is a three-tuple hB; T; Zi,
where B:

0; bDL
 ! 0; bDL is a debt rule, T : [0; bDL] ! [0; 1] is a tax rule, and
Z : [0; bDL]! [0; y] is a social security rule, such that
hB; T; Zi = arg max
fb02[0;bDL];2[0;1];z2[0;y]g

;
subject to the government budget constraint
P (b0; (1  )  y; z0)  b0 + y = z + b;
where z0 = Z(b0).
We substitute the government budget constraint into the political objective function
to obtain the following unconstrained problem:
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max
fz;b0g
!  (b+ z)
1    1
1   + (1  !) 

(y   z   b)1    1
1   +  
(b0 + Z(b0))1    1
1  

:
The tax rate  disappears from the objective function because the tax revenue from the
young is returned to them via the purchase of government bonds.
The rst-order conditions with respect to z and b0 are
z : !  (b+ z)    (1  !)  (y   z   b)  = 0;
b0 : 1 + Z 0(b0) = 0.
An analytical solution of z can be obtained by solving the rst-order condition with
respect to z:
z = Z(b)  y
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

  b: (10)
The function in (10) results in Z 0(b) =  1, implying that the rst-order condition with
respect to b0 is satised for any b.
To obtain equilibrium tax and debt policy functions, we need to determine the price
that clears the asset market. We substitute the social security function in (10) into the
government budget constraint (4) with bs = b to obtain
pb+ y =
y
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

:
We substitute this condition and z0 = y=
n
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

o
 b0 into the asset-market clearing
condition (5) to obtain (p=)
1
 = ((1  !)=!) 1 , or
p =   1  !
!
: (11)
This expression represents the equilibrium price in the asset market. The following as-
sumption ensures that the price is below unity:
Assumption 1.   1 !
!
< 1.
Given the equilibrium price in (11), the government budget constraint in (4) with
b = bs becomes
  1  !
!
 b0 + y = z + b: (12)
The debt limit, denoted by bDL, is dened as the debt level satisfying the government
budget constraint with  = 1 and z = 0. With p = (1 !)=!, bDL satises ((1  !)=!)
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bDL + 1  y = 0 + bDL, or
bDL =
y
1    1 !
!
. (13)
The tax and debt policy functions, denoted by  = T (b) 2 [0; 1] and b0 = B(b) 2
[0; bDL], are such that they satisfy the government budget constraint (12). Specically,
we focus on a linear debt policy function, which is given by
B(b) = B0 +B1  b; (14)
where B0 and B1 are the parameters. The tax policy function must be specied such that
the government budget constraint (12) is satised:
T (b) =
1
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

    1  !
!y
 (B0 +B1b) : (15)
Equilibrium policy functions are given by (10), (14), and (15). Let z, b, and  denote
the steady-state values of z, b, and  , respectively. The remaining task is to determine a set
of parameters that ensures a stable steady-state political equilibrium with z 2 [0; y];b 2
0; bDL

and  2 [0; 1]. The following proposition presents the set.
Proposition 1: Suppose that the following conditions hold:
B0  0 and B1 2
 
 1; 1  1
y

(
1 +

1  !
!
 1

)
B0
#
:
There exists a stable political equilibrium with z 2 [0; y];b 2 0; bDL and  2 [0; 1]
described by the following linear Markov strategy:
Z(b) =
y
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

  b;
B(b) = B0 +B1b;
T (b) =
1
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

  1
y
   1  !
!
 (B0 +B1b):
Proof. See the Appendix.
The political equilibrium in the present economy has the following features. First,
consumption levels in youth and old-age are constant across generations. Second, a one-
unit government bond issue reduces social security payment by one unit. Third, there are
multiple political equilibria indexed by the free parameters B0 and B1. Because this work
addresses a stationary equilibrium, B0 and B1 are set to be constant over time.
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The intuition behind the rst feature is as follows. The aggregate resource in the
current economy is given by y: this value is constant over time. The scramble for limited
resources occurs between the young and the old in every period via the political process.
Because the political powers of the young and the old are constant over time, the frac-
tions of resources allocated to the young and the old are also constant over time. The
consumption levels in youth and old-age are constant across generations, except for the
initial old agents. Specically, the consumption of the initial old is co0 = b 1 + z0; the
consumption levels in youth and old age after generation 0 are, respectively,
cy =
 
1 !
!
 1
  y
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

and co =
y
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

:
The second feature is due to that government bonds and social security are perfect sub-
stitute for funding old-age consumption. Recall that the old-age consumption is constant
as mentioned above. Given this property, the budget constraint in old age, cot = b + z,
implies that the sum of government bond repayment and social security payment is con-
stant over time. Therefore, one unit of government bond repayment is replaced by one
unit of social security payment.
Finally, to consider the third feature, notice that the government expenditure, b + z,
is constant over time:
b+ z = Z(b) + b =
1
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

 y
. This constancy implies that the government revenue is also constant over time. The
constant revenue comprises tax revenue from the young and the issue of government bonds
to the young. The ratio of tax to government bonds issued for funding expenditure might
depend on the preferences of the young. However, these preferences are independent of
tax and government bonds issued because youngs consumption level in the next period
(i.e., old age) is independent of the funding mechanism, as demonstrated in the rst
feature. Therefore, there are multiple political equilibria, depending on the government
expenditure funding mechanism.
Technically, a multiplicity of equilibria arises from the lack of a rst-order condition
with respect to  . The choice of the tax rate does not a¤ect the objective function of
the government, as demonstrated in the unconstrained problem. In this situation, the
government must set three policy variables,  , b0, and z, by using only two rst-order
conditions with respect to b0 and z. Therefore, the government can freely choose the tax
rate and the issue of government bonds as long as they satisfy the government budget
constraint.
The abovementioned features create a negative correlation between tax and govern-
10
ment debt along the equilibrium path that displays monotone convergence: a lower tax
rate is associated with a higher level of government debt if B1 > 0. The result of the
negative correlation is opposite to the result of the positive correlation demonstrated in
Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) in a small open economy framework and in Röhrs
(2010) in a closed economy framework. However, our result is consistent with the recent
empirical evidence in OECD countries.
In closing this section, we consider the political power of the old and its impact on
utility across generations. Specically, we consider the utility of the initial old, denoted
by V old 1 , and the lifetime utility of each young generation in period t  1, denoted by
V young, which are given by, respectively,
V old 1 =
 
y
1+( 1 !! )
1

!1 
  1
1   ;
V young =
1
1   
8<: y1 +  1 !
!
 1

9=;
1 

"
1  !
!
 1 

+ 
#
  1 + 
1   ;
where b 1 is the initial government debt. Direct calculation leads to
@V young
@!
< 0;
@V old 1
@!
> 0:
The details of the calculation are given in the Appendix. The result suggests that an
increase in the political power of the old benets the initial old at the expense of successive
generations.
4 Extensions
To this point, we have analyzed the politics of government debt in the framework in which
(i) government spending is limited to old-age social security and (ii) each generation is
composed of homogeneous agents. In this section, we attempt to relax these assumptions
and investigate how the analysis and the results of the basic model are modied by this
relaxation.
In the rst part of this section, we keep the assumption of homogeneous agents but in-
troduce public goods as an alternative form of government spending. Under this extended
framework, we consider how the tax revenue is allocated between public goods and social
security via politics. In the second part of this section, we limit the government spending
to social security, as in the basic model, but allow for two types of agents: the rich and
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the poor. We demonstrate how income is reallocated between two types of agents via
politics.
4.1 Public Goods vs. Social Security
Let gt denote the public goods provision in period t. The utility function of an agent in
generation t is specied by
(cyt )
1    1
1   +  
(gt)
1    1
1   +  

(cot+1)
1    1
1   +  
(gt+1)
1    1
1  

;
where (> 0) is a parameter representing the public goods preferences. An agent maxi-
mizes this utility subject to the budget constraints in youth and old age given in Section 2.
The consumption functions and the demand function for government bonds are the same
as those under the basic model in Section 2 because public goods enter into the utility
function in such a way that they have no e¤ect on consumption and saving decisions. The
asset-market-clearing condition is implicitly given by pt = P (bt; (1  t)  y; zt+1), or (5).
The government budget constraint is now modied to
ptb
s
t + ty = zt + gt + b
s
t 1 8t  0:
Because of the nature of public goods, the per capita level of public goods is equivalent to
the aggregate level of public goods. We substitute the government budget constraint, the
asset-market-clearing condition, and the consumption functions into the utility function.
Then we obtain the following indirect utility functions of the young and the old:
V y =
[(1  )  y   P (b0; (1  )  y; z0)  b0]1    1
1   +  
(b0 + z0)1    1
1  
+   (g)
1    1
1   +  
(g0)1    1
1   ; (16)
V o =
(b+ z)1    1
1   +  
(g)1    1
1   : (17)
The objective function of the government is 
 = !V o + (1   !)V y. We substitute
the government budget constraint and the asset-market-clearing condition (5) into 
 to
obtain the objective function in the unconstrained maximization problem:
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 = !  (b+ z)
1    1
1   + (1  !) 

(y   z   g   b)1    1
1   +  
(b0 + z0)1    1
1  

+   (g)
1    1
1   + (1  !)   
(g0)1    1
1   :
The tax rate disappears from the objective function in this extended framework for the
same reason it did in the basic model.
To determine the equilibrium policy functions, we solve the unconstrained optimization
problem and obtain the rst-order conditions with respect to z, g, and b0:
z : !  (b+ z)    (1  !)  (y   z   g   b)  = 0;
g : (1  !)  (y   z   g   b)      (g)  = 0;
b0 : (b0 + z0)  

1 +
@z0
@b0

+   (g0)   @g
0
@b0
= 0:
Analytical solutions of z and g are obtained by solving the rst-order conditions with
respect to z and g for z and g, respectively,
z = Z(b) =  

1  !

 1

 y   b; (18)
g = G(b) =  

1  !
!
 1

 y; (19)
where
  1 
1 !
!
 1

n
1 +
 
1 !

 1

o
+
 
1 !

 1

:
The functions in (18) and (19) result in Z 0(b) =  1 and G0(b) = 0, implying that the
rst-order condition with respect to b0 holds for any b.
The remaining task is to determine the functional forms of tax and debt policy func-
tions in the same manner as in the previous section. First, we compute the price that
clears the asset market. We substitute the social security policy function (18) and the gov-
ernment budget constraint into the asset-market-clearing condition given by (5). Then,
we obtain p =   1 !
!
< 1, where p < 1 holds under Assumption 1. The price in the
current economy is equivalent to that in the basic model because here public goods have
no direct e¤ect on economic decisions. With p =   (1   !)=!, the government budget
constraint is reduced to
  1  !
!
 b0 + y =  
(
1  !

 1

+

1  !
!
 1

)
 y:
13
Next, we focus on a debt policy specied by a linear function, B(b) = B0+B1  b. The
equilibrium tax policy function must be set to satisfy the abovementioned government
budget constraint:
T (b) =  
(
1  !

 1

+

1  !
!
 1

)
    1  !
!y
 (B0 +B1b) :
Following the same procedure as in the previous section, we identify a set of parame-
ters, B0 and B1, that ensure a stable steady-state political equilibrium with z 2 [0; y];b 2
0; bDL

and  2 [0; 1].
Proposition 2. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
B0  0 and B1 2
0@ 1; 1  1
y
 1
   1 !

 1

B0
35 :
There exists a stable political equilibrium with z 2 [0; y];b 2 0; bDL and  2 [0; 1]
described by the following linear Markov strategy:
Z(b) =  

1  !

 1

 y   b;
G(b) =  

1  !
!
 1

 y;
B(b) = B0 +B1b;
T (b) =  
(
1  !

 1

+

1  !
!
 1

)
  1
y
   1  !
!
 (B0 +B1b) :
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result in Proposition 2 indicates that an introduction of public goods does not
qualitatively a¤ect the property of the political equilibrium in the basic model. The
extended model still has the following features, which were embodied in the basic model:
(i) a multiplicity of equilibria depending on the parameters B0 and B1; (ii) a one-to-one
trade-o¤ between government bond issue and social security payment; and (iii) a negative
correlation between tax and government debt along the equilibrium path that displays
monotone convergence.
In addition to these features, a notable feature of the extended model is that there
remains an intertemporal link such that the debt policy function depends on the previous
level of government debt. This result counters the argument by Röhrs (2010). In the closed
14
economy model with public goods but without old-age social security, she demonstrated
that the policy function for debt is at and thus independent of the previous level of
government debt. Based on this result, she argued that the result of a at level of debt
is a generic feature of the closed economy model. However, our result indicates that an
introduction of old-age social security into her model breaks an intertemporal dichotomy.
The result in Proposition 2 shows that the level of public goods provision is constant
and independent of the free parameters B0 and B1. Thus, we can perform a comparative
statics analysis to examine the e¤ect of the political power of the old on public goods
provision. The following corollary summarizes the result. Proof is given in the Appendix.
Corollary 1. Consider an increase in ! that implies an increase in the political power
of the old.
(i) Suppose that 1= > 1. There is an inverse U-shaped relationship between ! and the
equilibrium public goods provision: @g=@! R 0 if and only if ! Q 1=2.
(ii) Suppose that 1= < 1. There is a U-shaped relationship between ! and the equilibrium
public goods provision: @g=@! R 0 if and only if ! R 1=2.
(iii) Suppose that 1= = 1. There is no e¤ect of ! on the public goods provision:
To investigate the result in Corollary 1, we examine the rst-order condition with
respect to g in the unconstrained optimization problem, given by
(1  !)  (y   z   g   b) | {z }
Marginal cost
=   (g) | {z }
Marginal benet
;
where the left-hand side and right-hand side show the marginal cost and benet of public
goods provision, respectively. The condition states that an increase in ! has the following
two opposing e¤ects. First, given z and b, such an increase lowers the marginal cost of
public goods provision, giving the government an incentive to choose a higher level of
public goods provision to equate the marginal cost and benet. This e¤ect has a positive
impact on public goods provision. Second, an increase in ! gives the government an
incentive to choose a higher level of social security, resulting in a larger marginal cost
of public goods provision given g and b. The government chooses a lower level of public
goods provision to balance the marginal cost and benet of public goods provision.
Which e¤ect overcomes the other depends on the interest-rate elasticity, 1=. If the
elasticity is high (1= > 1), the positive e¤ect overcomes the negative one when the
initial political power of the old is low (! < 1=2). However, the negative e¤ect overcomes
the positive one when the initial political power of the old is high (! > 1=2). The two
opposing e¤ects o¤set each other at ! = 1=2. Therefore, there is an inverse U-shaped
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relationship between ! and g if 1= > 1. The result is reversed when the elasticity is low
( 1= < 1): there is a U-shaped relationship between ! and g. The two e¤ects are always
o¤set each other if 1= = 1.
4.2 Rich vs. Poor
Suppose that there are two types of agents, the rich and the poor. The proportion of
the rich in each generation is 1    2 [0; 1], and the proportion of the poor is . The
proportion is stationary across generations.
The rich work in youth and retire in old age; the economic behavior of the rich is
similar to that in the basic model. Therefore, the demand function for government bonds
is given by (1), and consumption functions in youth and old-age are
cyrt =
(pt=)
1

pt + (pt=)
1

 [(1  t)  y + ptzt+1] ;
cort+1 =
1
pt + (pt=)
1

 [(1  t)  y + ptzt+1] ;
where cyrt and c
or
t+1 denote consumption of the rich in youth and in old age, respectively.
The poor are assumed to be unemployed or unable to work in youth. They receive
social security benets in both periods of life. In addition, because of the lack of labor
income, they are assumed to be unable to access nancial markets: they consume their
social security benets within each period. Under these two assumptions, the utility of
the poor in generation t becomes
V ypt =
(vt)
1    1
1   +  
(vt+1)
1    1
1   ;
where vt is the per capita social security payments to the poor in period t. We allow for
the possibility that the old-age social security for the poor, vt+1, could be di¤erent from
that for the rich, zt+1.
The government budget constraint is
ptb
s
t + (1  )  ty = (1  )  zt + 2vt + bst 1:
On the left-hand side, the second term, (1 ) ty, is the tax revenue from the rich young
agent. On the right-hand side, the rst term, (1  )  zt, is the social security payments
to the rich old agents; the second term, 2vt, is the social security payments to the poor
young and old.
The asset-market-clearing condition is bst = (1  )  bdt . With bst = bt and the demand
function in (1), the clearing condition is implicitly given by pt = P ((1  t)  y; bt; zt+1),
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or 
pt

 1

=
(1  )(1  t)  y   P (bt; (1  t)  y; zt+1)  bt
bt + (1  )  zt+1 : (20)
With pt = P ((1  t)  y; bt; zt+1) and the private and government budget constraints,
we can write the indirect utility functions of the rich young and the rich old as follows:
V yrt =

(1  t)  y   11   P ((1  t)  y; bt; zt+1)  bt
	1    1
1   +  
 
1
1   bt + zt+1
1    1
1   ;
V ort =
 
1
1   bt 1 + zt
1    1
1   :
The political objective function is a weighted average of the indirect utility functions

t = !  fV opt + (1  )  V ort g+ (1  !)  fV ypt + (1  )  V yrt g :
The task of the government in period t is to maximize 
t subject to the government
budget constraint:
P ((1  t)  y; bt; zt+1)  bt + (1  )  ty = (1  )  zt + 2vt + bt 1: (21)
We substitute the government budget constraint into 
t to obtain the objective function
in the unconstrained problem with recursive notation:

 = !(1  ) 
 
1
1   b+ z
1    1
1  
+ (1  !)(1  )
" 
y   z   2
1   v   11   b
1    1
1   +  
 
1
1   b0 + z0
1    1
1  
#
+   (v)
1    1
1   + (1  !) 
(v0)1    1
1   :
By replacing v with g, we observe that the current objective function has a qualitatively
similar form as that in Subsection 4.1. Therefore, we can determine the equilibrium policy
functions and price following the same procedure as in Subsection 4.1 (See Appendix for
the calculation details).
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Proposition 3. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
B0  0 and B1 2
 
 1; 1  1e  11 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1  y
B0
#
:
There exists a stable political equilibrium with z 2 [0; y];b 2 0; bDL and  2 [0; 1]
featured by the following linear Markov strategy:
Z(b) = e  1
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1  y   1
1    b;
V (b) = e  1
2


1  !
!
 1

 y
B(b) = B0 +B1b;
T (b) = e  1
1   
(
1  
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 +

1  !
!
 1

)
  1
(1  )  y   
1  !
!
 (B0 +B1b);
where e  (1  )  1
1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 
n
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

o
+
 
1 !
!
 1

:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The political equilibrium in the current model shows the same property as does the
equilibrium in Subsection 4.1 because the objective function here is qualitatively simi-
lar to that in Subsection 4.1. Therefore, the current model still has the three features
embodied in the basic model: (i) a multiplicity of political equilibria; (ii) a one-to-one
trade-o¤ between government bond issue and social security payment; and (iii) a negative
correlation between tax and government debt along the equilibrium path that displays
monotone convergence.
In the current framework with the rich and the poor, the size of social security payment
to the poor is constant and independent of the free parameters B0 and B1. Thus, we can
perform a comparative statics analysis to examine the e¤ects of the political power of the
old, !, and the share of the poor, , on the size of social security payment to the poor,
v. The following two corollaries summarize the e¤ects of ! and  on v. Proof is given in
the Appendix.
Corollary 2. Consider an increase in ! that implies an increase of the political power
of the old.
(i) Suppose that 1= > 1. There is an inverse U-shaped relationship between ! and the
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size of social security payment to the poor: @v=@! R 0 if and only if ! Q 1=2.
(ii) Suppose that 1= < 1. There is a U-shaped relationship between ! and the size of
social security payment to the poor: @v=@! R 0 if and only if ! R 1=2.
(iii) Suppose that 1= = 1. There is no e¤ect of ! on the size of social security payment
to the poor: @v=@! = 0.
Corollary 3. An increase in the share of the poor results in a smaller size of the social
security payment to the poor: @v=@ < 0.
The result in Corollary 2 is qualitatively similar to that in Corollary 1. The similarity
is due to that social security payment to the poor in the current model plays the same
role as do public goods in the former model at the stage of government optimization. We
can apply the interpretation for the result in Corollary 1 to the result in Corollary 2.
Corollary 3 states that an increase in the share of the poor results in a decrease, rather
than an increase, in the size of social security payment to the poor. The mechanism behind
this counterintuitive result is simple: in an economy with a xed endowment, an increase
in the share of the poor yields a decrease in the tax base while it increases recipients.
Therefore, the benet per person decreases in response to an increase in the poor.
5 Discussion
The analysis to this point has been based on the individual preferences specied by the
utility function with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Under this speci-
cation with the notion of stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, we obtained the following
three properties of political equilibrium: (i) a multiplicity of equilibria, (ii) a one-to-one
trade-o¤ between government bond issue and social security payment, and (iii) a negative
correlation between tax and government debt along the equilibrium path that displays
monotone convergence.
From a robustness perspective, we next investigate whether these properties still hold
under a generalized utility function. Our focus is on the economy with the social security
and public goods considered in Subsection 4.1. We assume the utility function of the form
u(cyt ) +    (gt) +  

u(cot+1) +    (gt+1)
	
;
where u() and  () are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously dif-
ferentiable functions with limc!0(du=dc) = +1 and limg!0(d =dg) = +1 and where
(> 0) is an exogenous parameter that represents the public goods preference.
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The objective function of the government is 
 = !V o+(1 !)V y. After some manip-
ulation, we obtain the objective function 
 in the unconstrained optimization problem in
a recursive form:

 = !  u (b+ z) + (1  !)  [u(y   z   g   b) +   u (b0 + z0)]
+    (g) + (1  !)       (g0):
Derivation of this function is given in the Appendix.
The rst-order conditions with respect to z, g, and b0 are, respectively,
z : !  u0 (b+ z)  (1  !)  u0(y   z   g   b) = 0;
g :    0(g)  (1  !)  u0(y   z   g   b) = 0;
b0 : u0 (b0 + z0) 

1 +
@z0
@b0

+    0(g0)  @g
0
@b0
= 0;
where u0() and  0() represent rst derivatives.
Suppose that the policy functions of social security and public goods are given by(
z = Z(b)  Z   b;
g = G(b)  G; (22)
where Z 2 (0; y) and G 2 (0; y) are determined by the rst-order conditions with respect
to z and g:
!  u0   Z  (1  !)  u0(y   Z   G) = 0; (23)
   0( G)  (1  !)  u0(y   Z   G) = 0:
Under the assumption of u and  , there is a unique pair of Z 2 (0; y) and G 2 (0; y)
that satisfy the above two conditions. The guess in (22) results in a constant objective
function that is independent of b, b0, and  . In addition, the rst-order conditions with
respect to b0 are also satised under the guess in (22) because (22) results in 1+@z0=@b0 =
1 1 = 0 and @g0=@b0 = 0. Therefore, the two functions in (22) are the equilibrium policy
functions of social security and public goods.
The next task is to show that the equilibrium price is p =   (1   !)=!. We utilize
the governments rst-order condition with respect to z and the policy functions in (23)
to write the ratio of marginal utilities in youth and old age as
u0(co)
u0(cy)
=
u0( Z)
u0(y   Z   G) =
1  !
!
:
20
We substitute this into the consumption Euler equation to obtain:
p =   u
0(co)
u0(cy)
=   1  !
!
< 1
where an inequality holds under Assumption 1.
The nal task is to determine the equilibrium tax and debt policy functions. With
p =   (1  !)=!, the government budget constraint is
  1  !
!
 b0 + y = Z + G.
We focus on a linear debt policy function specied by
B(b) = B0 +B1b: (24)
Given this debt policy function, the tax policy function is set to satisfy the above govern-
ment budget constraint:
T (b) =
Z
y
+
G
y
  
y
 1  !
!
 (B0 +B1b) : (25)
The equilibrium policy functions are given in (22), (24) and (25). We can verify
that the three properties described at the beginning of this section still hold under the
assumption of a generalized utility function.
6 Conclusion
This paper reconsidered the models of Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) and Röhrs
(2010) who investigated intergenerational conict over government debt, tax, and public
goods. Specically, our analysis is based on the closed-economymodel by Röhrs (2010) but
di¤ers from the previous two studies in that, instead of public goods, we introduce social
security payment to the old as government expenditure. Under this alternative framework,
we demonstrate the following three results: (i) an intertemporal link of resource allocation
via debt; (ii) multiple political equilibria; and (iii) a negative correlation between tax and
debt.
The rst result, which was missed in Röhrs (2010), can be restored by the introduction
of social security. The second and the third results come from the one-to-one trade-o¤
between government debt and social security: this property is specic to our closed-
economy framework with social security payment to the old. Specically, the third result,
which is opposite to that in Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) and Röhrs (2010),
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is consistent with the empirical evidence from OECD countries. These three results are
robust to the introduction to public goods as additional government expenditure or to
the income heterogeneity within a generation.
The main caveat of our analysis lies in the assumption of a closed economy: the
government debt is solely owned by the residents. This assumption approximates the
situation, in Japan where the proportion of government debt held by non-residents is
approximately 5%. However, the proportion is more than 40% in Italy and Spain, which
also face a massive budget decit, as does Japan (Artus, 2010). An introduction of social
security payment to the old into the small open economy framework of Song, Storesletten
and Zilibotti (2011) will provide more insight to the politics of government debt; this
extension is left to future work.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1.
First, we dene a set (B0; B1) that ensures a stable steady-state equilibrium with
b 2 [0; bDL]. From the equilibrium debt policy function in (14), b is given by
b =
B0
1 B1 : (26)
Expression (14) requires that B1 2 ( 1; 1) for the stability of the equilibrium path of b.
Under the assumption of B1 2 ( 1; 1), we obtain
b  0 , B0  0:
With (13), which denes bDL, we can rewrite b < bDL as
b  bDL , B1  1  1
y


1    1  !
!

B0:
Therefore, there exists a stable b 2 0; bDL if B0 and B1 satisfy the following:
B0  0; (27)
B1 2

 1; 1  1
y


1    1  !
!

B0

: (28)
Second, we determine a set (B0; B1) that ensures z 2 [0; y]. Under the conditions of
(27) and (28) for B0 and B1, it always holds that z  y; and z  0 is rewritten as
z  0 , B1  1  1
y

(
1 +

1  !
!
 1

)
B0: (29)
Third, we determine a set (B0; B1) that ensures  2 [0; 1]. Under the conditions of
(27) and (28),   0 and   1 are rewritten as follows:
  0 , B1  1  1
y

(
1 +

1  !
!
 1

)
   1  !
!
B0; (30)
  1 ,  
 
1 !
!
 1

1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

   1  !
!y
 B0
1 B1 : (31)
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The condition (31) always holds because the left-hand side is negative and the right-hand
side is positive under the conditions of (27) and (28).
The analysis so far indicates that the existence of a stable steady-state equilibrium
with z 2 [0; y], b 2 0; bDL, and  2 [0; 1] requires (27), (28), (29), and (30). These
conditions are summarized in Proposition 1.

7.2 E¤ect of ! on Utility
Direct calculation leads to
@V old 1
@!
> 0;
@V young
@!
=
8<: y1 +  1 !
!
 1

9=;
1 
 1



1  !
!
 1

 1


  1
!
  1  !
!2


24  1
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1


(
1  !
!
 1 

+ 
)
+
!
1  !
35 :
The derivative @V young=@! implies
@V young
@!
R 0 , 1 Q   1  !
!
:
Under Assumption 1, we obtain @V young=@! < 0.

7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The debt policy function B(b) = B0 + B1b requires B1 2 ( 1; 1) for the stability of the
steady-state equilibrium. The steady-state level of b, denoted by b, is b = B0=(1   B1).
Therefore, b  0 holds if and only if B0  0 under the assumption of B1 2 ( 1; 1).
The debt limit is still given by bDL in (13). Thus b  bDL requires
b  bDL , B1  1  1
y


1    1  !
!

B0:
A pair (B0; B1) must satisfy the following for the existence of a stable path of fbg that
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converges to the steady state with b 2 [0; bDL]:(
B0  0;
B1 2

 1; 1  1
y
 1    1 !
!
	 B0i : (32)
Next, we determine a set (B0; B1) that ensures z 2 [0; y]. Under the abovementioned
conditions in (32), it always holds that z < y; and z > 0 is rewritten as
z  0 , B1  1  1
y
 1
   1 !

 1

B0:
Third, we determine a set (B0; B1) that ensures 2[0; 1]. With the debt policy function
given in Proposition 2 and b = B0=(1 B1), the steady-state level of  is
 =  
(
1  !

 1

+

1  !
!
 1

)
    1  !
!y
 B0
1 B1 :
We obtain
 > 0 , B1 < 1  1
y
 1
 
n 
1 !

 1
 +
 
1 !
!
 1

o    1  !
!
B0
and
 < 1,
n 
1 !

 1
 +
 
1 !
!
 1

o
 
1 !
!
 1
 
n
1 +
 
1 !

 1

o
+
 
1 !

 1

  1 <   1  !
!y
 B0
1 B1 :
The second condition always holds because the left-hand side is negative and the right-
hand side is positive for any feasible B0 and B1. The conditions derived so far are
summarized as in Proposition 2.

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7.4 Proof of Corollary 1
The level of public goods is
g =  

1  !
!
 1

 y
=
 
1 !
!
 1
 
1 !
!
 1
 
n
1 +
 
1 !

 1

o
+
 
1 !

 1

 y
=
1
1 +
 
1

 1
 
n
(1  !) 1 + (!) 1
o  y:
Di¤erentiation of the term
n
(1  !) 1 + (!) 1
o
with respect to ! leads to
d
n
(1  !) 1 + (!) 1
o
d!
8><>: Q 0 ,
(
! Q 1
2
! R 1
2
if 1

> 1;
if 1

> 1;
= 0 if 1

= 1:
Given this result, we obtain the result in Corollary 1.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 3
To determine the equilibrium policy functions, we solve the unconstrained optimization
problem and obtain the following rst-order conditions with respect to z, v, and b0:

 = !(1  ) 
 
1
1   b+ z
1    1
1  
+ (1  !)(1  )
" 
y   z   2
1   v   11   b
1    1
1   +  
 
1
1   b0 + z0
1    1
1  
#
+   (v)
1    1
1   + (1  !) 
(v0)1    1
1   :
z : ! 

1
1    b+ z
 
  (1  !) 

y   z   2
1    v  
1
1    b
 
= 0;
v : 2(1  !) 

y   z   2
1    v  
1
1    b
 
  (v)  = 0;
b0 : (1  ) 

1
1    b
0 + z0
 


1
1   +
@z0
@b0

+   (v0)   @v
0
@b0
= 0:
The rst-order conditions with respect to z and v lead to the following analytical
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solutions:
z = Z(b) 
1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1
1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 
n
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

o
+
 
1 !
!
 1

 y   1
1    b; (33)
v = V (b) 
1 
2
  1 !
!
 1

1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 
n
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

o
+
 
1 !
!
 1

 y: (34)
The functions in (33) and (34) result in Z 0(b0) =  1 and V 0(b0) = 0, respectively. These
results imply that the rst-order condition with respect to b0 is satised for any b.
The next task is to determine the functional forms of the tax and debt policy functions.
First, we compute the price that clears the asset market. With the social security policy
functions, (33) and (34), and the government budget constraint, (21), the asset-market-
clearing condition (20) is reduced to p =   (1   !)=! < 1, where p < 1 holds under
Assumption 1.
Given (33) and (34) and the equilibrium price, the government budget constraint is
now reduced to
  1  !
!
 b+ (1  )  y = e (1  
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 +

1  !
!
 1

)
 y;
where e  (1  )  1
1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 
n
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

o
+
 
1 !
!
 1

:
We focus on a debt policy function specied by a linear policy function, B(b) =
B0+B1  b. The equilibrium tax policy function must be set to satisfy the aforementioned
government budget constraint:
 = T (b) 
e
1   
(
1  
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 +

1  !
!
 1

)
  1
(1  )  y   
1  !
!
 (B0 +B1b):
In what follows, we seek to determine a set of parameters, B0 and B1, that ensure a stable
steady-state political equilibrium with z 2 [0; y];b 2 0; bDL,  2 [0; 1], and v 2 [0; y].
The debt policy function, B(b) = B0+B1  b, requires B1 2 ( 1; 1) for the stability of
the steady-state equilibrium. The steady-state level of b, denoted by b, is b = B0=(1 B1).
Therefore, b  0 holds if and only if B0  0 under the assumption of B1 2 ( 1; 1).
The debt limit, denoted by bDL, is derived by setting  = 1 and z = v = 0 in the
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government budget constraint (21). With p =   (1  !)=!, bDL becomes
bDL  (1  )y
1    1 !
!
;
and b  bDL requires
b  bDL , B1  1  1
(1  )  y 

1    1  !
!

B0:
A pair (B0; B1) must satisfy the following for the existence of a stable path of fbg that
converges to the steady state with b 2 0; bDL:(
B0  0
B1 2

 1; 1  1
(1 )y 

1    1 !
!
	 B0i (35)
Next, we derive the condition that ensures z 2 [0; y]. Under the assumption of (35),
it always holds that z < y. With (33) and b = B0=(1 B1), we have
z  0, B1  1 
1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 
n
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

o
+
 
1 !
!
 1

(1  )  1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1  y
B0:
Third, we determine a set (B0; B1) that ensures  2 [0; 1]. With b = B0=(1 B1), the
steady-state  becomes
 =
e
1   
(
1  
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 +

1  !
!
 1

)
  1
(1  )  y   
1  !
!
 B0
1 B1 ;
which leads to
  0, B1 < 1  1
y
   1  !
!

1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 
n
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

o
+
 
1 !
!
 1

(1  ) 
n
1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 +  1 !
!
 1

o B0; and
  1,
1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 +  1 !
!
 1

1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 
n
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

o
+
 
1 !
!
 1

  1
<
1
(1  )  y   
1  !
!
 B0
1 B1 ;
where   1 holds for any pair (B0; B1) satisfying (35). The conditions derived so far are
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summarized as in Proposition 3.

7.6 Proof of Corollaries 2 and 3
The social security payment to the poor is
v = e  1
2


1  !
!
 1

 y;
=
1  
2
 1
1 
2
 f2  (1  !)g 1 
n
1 +
 
1 !
!
 1

o
+
 
1 !
!
 1



1  !
!
 1

 y
=
y
(2)
1
 
n
(!)
1
 + (1  !) 1
o
+ 2
1 
:
Because ! has an e¤ect on v through the term
n
(!)
1
 + (1  !) 1
o
, we can apply the result
in the proof of Corollary 1. The e¤ect of  on v is observed from the term 2=(1  ) of
the denominator in the third line.

7.7 Derivation of the government objective function in Section
5
An agent maximizes his/her utility
u(cyt ) +    (gt) +  

u(cot+1) +    (gt+1)
	
subject to the budget constraints in youth and old age:
cyt + ptb
d
t  (1  t)  y;
cot+1  bdt + zt+1:
Solving the problem yields the consumption Euler equation
  u0(cot+1) = pt  u0(cyt ):
We substitute the budget constraints into the above consumption Euler equation to
obtain the demand function of government bond:
bdt = b
d ((1  t)  y; zt+1; pt) :
29
The asset-market-clearing condition, bst = b
d
t = bt, gives an equilibrium price implicitly
given by
pt = P (bt; (1  t)  y; zt+1): (36)
The government budget constraint is
ptb
s
t + ty = zt + gt + b
s
t 1: (37)
With (36) and (37) with bst = bt, the consumption in youth becomes
cyt = (1  t)  y   P (bt; (1  t)  y; zt+1)  bt
= y   zt   gt   bt 1; (38)
where the second line comes from (37), and the consumption in old age is
cot+1 = bt + zt+1; c
o
t = bt 1 + zt: (39)
By the use of (38) and (39), we can derive the objective function in the unconstrained
problem, as demonstrated in Section 5.

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